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Note 
 
Treating the Disease or Punishing the Criminal?: 
Effectively Using Drug Court Sanctions To Treat 
Substance Use Disorder and Decrease Criminal 
Conduct 
Caitlinrose Fisher* 
In 1969, forty-four percent of individuals entering the Dis-
trict of Columbia jail system tested positive for heroin, a statis-
tic used to link substance use to crime.1 Two years later, Presi-
dent Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” attempting to address 
substance abuse and its negative impact on society.2 Despite 
the ongoing “war on drugs,” thirty-five years after its inaugura-
tion over half of all state inmates abused drugs the year before 
their admission to prison.3 The lack of change in the correlation 
between drug use and criminal activity in those thirty-five 
years suggests that traditional threats of punishment and pro-
bation do not deter drug use by the majority of individuals 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2010, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. I am deeply grateful to Professor Kevin 
Reitz for his invaluable assistance and feedback throughout this process. 
Thank you also to Professor Kristin Hickman, Professor Robert Stein, and Pro-
fessor Jessica Clarke, for their mentorship, guidance, and encouragement 
throughout law school. I would also like to thank my family, Patricia 
Hoolihan, Chris Fisher, and Kelly Fisher, and my husband Jacob Held, for 
their constant support of my personal and professional dreams. Copyright © 
2014 by Caitlinrose Fisher.  
 1. See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs 
.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); see also 
JANINE M. ZWEIG ET AL., URBAN INST., 2 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT 
EVALUATION: WHAT’S HAPPENING WITH DRUG COURTS? A PORTRAIT OF ADULT 
DRUG COURTS IN 2004, at 7 (Janine M. Zweig et al. eds., 2011) (“A large and 
impressive research literature shows that substance use and abuse are linked 
to crime and criminal behavior.”). 
 2. Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, supra note 1. 
 3. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Methamphetamine Use 
Increasing Among State and Federal Prisoners (Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.bjs 
.gov/content/pub/press/dudsfp04pr.cfm (finding fifty-three percent of state in-
mates and forty-five percent of federal inmates had abused or been addicted to 
drugs the year prior to admission to prison).  
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struggling with addiction. Something other than the Presi-
dent’s war on drugs and long periods of jail time was needed to 
address the correlation between addiction and incarceration.4 A 
possible solution emerged in Miami in 1989, with the first drug 
court.5 
Evidence suggests that drug courts can successfully reduce 
drug use and criminal behavior, both during and after a de-
fendant’s drug court participation.6 Due to its apparent success, 
the drug court model has been replicated in a variety of “prob-
lem-solving courts,” which address conditions, such as alcohol-
ism and mental illness, that contribute to criminal activity.7 
Drug courts obtain results by integrating treatment, close su-
pervision, frequent drug testing, sanctions for court violations, 
and incentives for compliant behavior.8 Although drug courts 
achieve desirable results for both the participants and society 
as a whole, the rules governing responses to court violations 
vary greatly among courts and are not grounded in recent med-
ical definitions of substance use disorder.9 The lack of con-
sistent administration of sanctions and termination from drug 
courts leaves appellate courts with little guidance when field-
ing challenges from drug court participants.10 Drug courts are 
filling a unique and essential niche in the criminal justice sys-
tem yet are vulnerable to criticism because of this procedural 
inconsistency.11  
 
 4. See JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., 
DUI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A NATIONAL STRATEGY, at vii (Mar. 1999) (not-
ing the success of drug courts in “slow[ing] the revolving door” of the criminal 
justice system).  
 5. JEFFREY TAUBER & KATHLEEN R. SNAVELY, NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., 
DRUG COURTS: A RESEARCH AGENDA 1 (Apr. 1999). 
 6. Id. at 2.  
 7. See Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Introduction to PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? vii–x (Paul Hig-
gins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009); see also TAUBER & HUDDLESTON, 
supra note 4, at vii (recommending the development of DUI courts based on 
the drug court model).  
 8. TAUBER & HUDDLESTON, supra note 4, at 4.  
 9. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6 (recognizing the need for 
additional research on rules governing sanctions and incentives).  
 10. E.g., Washington v. Cassill-Skilton, 94 P.3d 407, 410 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2004). 
 11. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 Stan. 
L. & Pol’y Rev. 417, 418 (2009) (“[D]rug courts . . . rest upon a series of contro-
versial methodological assumptions underlying the selection of the court as 
the locus of treatment provision and management. The court’s methodology 
implicates political issues of coercion and freedom . . . .”). 
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Due to their continued expansion, it appears as though 
drug courts are here to stay. Even assuming, however, that 
drug courts are a normatively positive alternative to traditional 
probation and punishment, there inevitably will be individuals 
who cannot resist the impulse to use drugs and thus violate the 
conditions of the drug court. Although scholarship has focused 
on the structure of the drug court, there is currently a lack of 
scholarship regarding how to administer the procedures in drug 
court, assuming the courts’ structure is jurisprudentially 
sound. There is also a lack of scholarship regarding how to best 
respond to those individuals who are unable to comply with the 
conditions of the court. This Note fills that current gap in 
scholarship, addressing a specific type of drug court: a court 
that only admits participants with diagnosed severe substance 
use disorder; a court that admits participants based on their 
disease, rather than the crimes they have committed;12 and a 
court with a medical professional or treatment representative 
as a member of the drug court team, present to inform the 
judge of the medical nature of certain court violations.13  
This Note argues that sanction administration in drug 
courts can and should be different from the processes in other 
criminal proceedings and traditional probation because of the 
need to treat participants’ underlying disease. Part I discusses 
medical advances in addiction studies, the evolution of drug 
courts, procedures in those courts, and recent probation reform. 
Part II analyzes innovations in probation and drug courts, spe-
cifically the procedures for responding to probation and drug 
court violations. Part III introduces a procedure for administer-
 
 12. When discussing model drug courts throughout, I will refer to them 
simply as drug courts. I limit my analysis to that specific type of drug court 
because it is limited by the severity of the disease of the participant. As fur-
ther developed below, my proposal requires comparing the nature of the dis-
ease with the nature of the violation when determining drug court sanctions. 
Thus, although this Note’s solution could be applied in other contexts, it will 
be most relevant and applicable for drug courts that restrict their participants 
to those diagnosed with severe substance use disorder. Currently only thirty-
eight percent of drug courts are limited to those diagnosed as “addicted” or 
“dependent.” ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 27. 
 13. Treatment is recognized as a “primary function” of drug courts and is 
the major activity drug court participants must participate in. Id. at 48.  
  This Note also assumes that the two primary goals of drug courts are 
rehabilitation and crime prevention. Drug courts present a unique opportunity 
to achieve both goals, because treating the underlying disease of substance use 
disorder increases the likelihood of rehabilitation and reintegration into socie-
ty and decreases the likelihood of future crimes and harm to society. See infra 
note 37 and accompanying text.  
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ing sanctions in drug courts that incorporates medical 
knowledge of substance use disorder and the benefits such a 
system would have on not only court participants but also ap-
pellate courts. Additionally, Part III responds to potential con-
cerns with this Note’s proposed solution. This Note ultimately 
proposes that the procedure for administering sanctions should 
vary based upon whether the sanction is in response to a dis-
ease-driven act or a non-disease-driven act, to better reflect and 
uphold drug courts’ unique role in treating severe substance 
use disorder, an underlying cause of criminal activity.  
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF DRUG COURTS AND PROBATION 
REFORM   
Drug courts emerged to address addiction and its correla-
tion to criminal activity. In order to understand the purpose of 
drug courts within the broader context of probation and sen-
tencing, it is important to first understand the disease of sub-
stance use disorder, the history of drug courts, and the differ-
ences between drug courts and traditional probation. Section A 
begins by discussing the disease of substance use disorder, 
commonly referred to as addiction. Section B addresses the 
emergence of drug courts, including their procedures, struc-
tures, and the way they integrate an understanding of sub-
stance use disorder into the disposition of a case. Finally, Sec-
tion C discusses some of the challenges facing probation and 
recent innovations in probation. 
A. THE NATURE OF ADDICTION 
Substance use disorder, commonly referred to as addiction, 
is a “misunderstood and deadly disease.”14 Despite the beliefs of 
some skeptics15 and Supreme Court dicta,16 in 2011 the Ameri-
 
 14. Marvin D. Seppala, Addiction: The Disease That Lies, CNN HEALTH 
(July 16, 2013, 6:02 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/15/health/addiction 
-relapse-cory-monteith; see also Peter W. Kalivas & Charles O’Brien, Drug 
Addiction as a Pathology of Staged Neuroplasticity, 33 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 166, 166 (2008) (“The last 20 years of research 
has made it clear that addiction to drugs is based on pathological changes in 
brain function produced by repeated pharmacological insult to the brain cir-
cuits that regulate how a person interprets and behaviorally responds to moti-
vationally relevant stimuli.”). 
 15. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, RETHINKING DRINKING: ALCOHOL 
AND YOUR HEALTH, NIH Pub. No. 13-3770, at 1 (2010) (suggesting that most 
people can quit drinking without professional treatment); Morris B. Hoffman, 
The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437, 1469–74 (2000) (summarizing 
criticisms of the disease theory of addiction); Stanton Peele, Ain’t Misbehavin’: 
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can Society of Addiction Medicine redefined addiction as a 
brain disease, as opposed to a social or behavioral disorder.17 
Additionally, in 2013 the American Psychiatric Association re-
leased the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), containing new nomencla-
ture and criteria for diagnosing addiction.18 As currently 
defined by leading medical literature, addiction, or substance 
use disorder, is a “primary, chronic disease of brain reward . . . 
and related circuitry. . . . characterized by inability to consist-
ently abstain.”19 The DSM-V lists eleven diagnostic criteria for 
substance use disorder, divided into four categories:  
 
Addiction Has Become an All-Purpose Excuse, 29 SCIENCES 14, 16 (1989) 
(“[R]epeated attempts to prove that addiction is a clear-cut medical condition 
have been, at best, inconclusive.”); David J. Hanson, Is Alcoholism a Disease?, 
ALCOHOL PROBS. & SOLUTIONS, http://www2.potsdam.edu/alcohol/ 
Controversies/Is-Alcoholism-a-Disease.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (argu-
ing that the medical definition of addiction is sociological and fluctuates, and 
the disease model was put forward to “provide[] an excuse and relieve[] [ad-
dicts] of responsibility for their behaviors”).  
 16. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1988) (discussing the 
split of medical authority regarding whether alcoholism is a disease, and stat-
ing that there is little evidence that alcohol use is involuntary and that addicts 
are not responsible for their use). It should be noted that this case is over fif-
teen years old, and therefore lacks the benefit of medical research regarding 
addiction. 
 17. Addiction Now Defined as Brain Disorder, Not Behavior Problem, 
LIVE SCIENCE (Aug. 15, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www.livescience.com/15563 
-addiction-defined-brain-disease.html. The American Society of Addiction 
Medicine redefined addiction after a four-year study that involved over eighty 
experts. Id.  
 18. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5 Implementation and Support, 
DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org (last visited Nov. 27, 2014) (released May 
2013); see also Charles O’Brien, Addiction and Dependence in DSM-V, 106 
ADDICTION 866, 867 (2010) (discussing changes to the definition of addiction in 
DSM-V).  
 19. Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med., Public Policy Statement: Definition of 
Addiction 1 (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.asam.org/docs/publicy-policy 
-statements/1definition_of_addiction_long_4-11.pdf; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-5 
483 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V], available at http://dsm 
.psychiatryonline.org/content.aspx?bookid=556&sectionid=41101782#1034405
77 (“An important characteristic of substance use disorders is an underlying 
change in brain circuits that may persist beyond detoxification, particularly in 
individuals with severe disorders.”); see also Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a 
Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278 SCIENCE 45, 46 (1997) (arguing that be-
cause addiction is tied to changes in brain structure and function, it is primar-
ily a brain disease); Seppala, supra note 14 (“[A]ddiction is a brain disease . . . 
. [that] resides in the limbic system, a subconscious part of our brain that is 
involved with memory, emotion and reward.”). But see Gene M. Heyman, Is 
Addiction a Chronic, Relapsing Disease?, in DRUG ADDICTION AND DRUG POL-
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(A) Impaired Control  
 (1) consume more than intended;  
 (2) desire to cut down but unsuccessful at doing so;  
 (3) great deal of time revolves around substance and use;  
 (4) cravings;  
(B) Social Impairment 
 (5) failure to fulfill obligations;  
 (6) continued use despite persistent social or interper-
sonal problems;  
 (7) give up important social activities to use;  
(C) Risky Use 
 (8) use when physically hazardous;  
 (9) use despite physical and psychological problem exac-
erbated by use;  
(D) Pharmacological Criteria 
 (10) increased tolerance;  
 (11) withdrawal.20  
An individual experiencing six or more simultaneous 
symptoms—described by DSM-V as an individual who chroni-
cally relapses—has “severe” substance use disorder.21 Because 
substance use disorder is a brain disease, treatment must re-
verse or compensate for brain changes.22 Also, because sub-
stance use disorder is a chronic disease, relapses are the “norm” 
in early recovery.23  
Substance use disorder not only affects the drug user’s 
health and functionality but also affects society as a whole. 
 
ICY 81, 107 (Philip B. Heymann & William N. Brownsberger eds., 2001) (argu-
ing that referring to addiction as a brain disease minimizes or does not ac-
count for those who quit and recover from their addiction).  
 20. DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84.  
 21. Severe substance use disorder is similar to the term “addiction.” The 
term “addiction,” however, was omitted from DSM-V because of its uncertain 
definition and negative connotations. Id. at 485. Throughout this Note, I use 
the term “addiction” and “severe substance use disorder” interchangeably.  
 22. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46; see also SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., UR-
BAN INST., 3 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE DRUG 
COURT EXPERIENCE 40 (Shelli B. Rossman et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE] (discussing the complexity of 
treatment and the importance of addressing both the underlying addiction and 
how to become a functioning member of society).  
 23. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46. 
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Many addicts commit crimes to finance their addiction24 or 
commit crimes while under the influence of a substance.25 Indi-
viduals suffering from addiction flood traditional corrections 
systems, with high rates of recidivism the norm—criminal be-
havior and its resultant costs to society are thus intertwined 
with severe substance use disorder.26 Drug courts emerged to 
relieve the traditional corrections system and address both 
problems in one forum. 
B. DRUG COURTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF SANCTIONS IN 
THOSE COURTS  
The war on drugs and subsequent implementation of zero 
tolerance approaches to drug use dramatically increased ar-
rests and incarceration for drug offenses as early as the 1960s.27 
Not only was the incarceration increase costly for taxpayers28 
but it also resulted in “increased poverty, neglected families, 
and . . . [other] problems for already disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods.”29 Because traditional courts lacked effective tools to 
deal with the underlying nature of severe substance use disor-
der, drug courts emerged to fill the missing niche in the correc-
tional system.30 
 
 24. William N. Brownsberger, Drug Users and Drug Dealers, in DRUG 
ADDICTION AND DRUG POLICY 51, 67–68 (Philip B. Heymann & William N. 
Brownsberger eds., 2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., DOUG MCVAY ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., TREATMENT OR 
INCARCERATION: NATIONAL AND STATE FINDINGS ON THE EFFICACY AND COST 
SAVINGS OF DRUG TREATMENT VERSUS IMPRISONMENT 6–10 (2004), available 
at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-01_rep_ 
mdtreatmentorincarceration_ac-dp.pdf.  
 27. See Greg Berman, Problem-Solving Justice and the Moment of Truth, 
in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 1, 8 
(Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009); Richard C. Boldt, A Cir-
cumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts, in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: 
JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 13, 25 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. 
Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding that the war on drugs impacted the case load 
and day-to-day functioning of traditional courts).  
 28. See Berman, supra note 27, at 8 (estimating that United States tax-
payers could save forty-six billion dollars if addicted defendants in the crimi-
nal justice system were linked to treatment instead of incarceration). 
 29. JOANN MILLER & DONALD C. JOHNSON, PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS: A 
MEASURE OF JUSTICE 32 (2009). 
 30. See Boldt, supra note 27, at 13; see also John A. Bozza, Benevolent Be-
havior Modification: Understanding the Nature and Limitations of Problem-
Solving Courts, 17 WIDENER L. J. 97, 104 (2007) (arguing that two aspects of 
drug courts differentiate them from traditional probation: (1) the systematic 
use of behavioral consequences; and (2) the consistent involvement of judges to 
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Drug courts are special dockets within a court system that 
serve addicted individuals.31 Most require both an eligible 
charge32 and a clinical assessment to participate.33 Participants 
undergo random drug and alcohol testing, some form of treat-
ment, and intensive (highly structured and supervised) proba-
tion.34 Since the first drug court was implemented in 1989,35 not 
only has the number of drug courts greatly expanded but prob-
lem-solving courts for a variety of anti-social conditions, such 
as alcoholism and mental illness, have also been implement-
ed.36 The proliferation of drug courts and problem-solving 
courts is due in large part to reduced recidivism rates and net 
costs to the government,37 although skeptics have challenged 
the empirical validity of statistics regarding drug court effica-
 
dispense consequences). But see Hoffman, supra note 15, at 1440 (arguing that 
jurisdictions rushed to implement drug courts without seriously considering 
their effectiveness).  
 31. See, e.g., WEST HUDDLESTON & DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE, NAT’L DRUG 
COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG 
COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 
(2011). 
 32. Eligible charges may include nonviolent drug offenses, theft, or other 
crimes stemming from the participant’s underlying addiction. Id.  
 33. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. An eligible charge most often means 
a non-violent offense. Id.  
 34. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 7.  
 35. TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 1.  
 36. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at ix (noting the existence of 
3,204 problem-solving courts and 2,147 drug courts by 2007); see also TAUBER 
& HUDDLESTON, supra note 4, at x (expanding drug court philosophy to DUI 
courts in 1998). Problem-solving courts have been defined as “[L]ocal courts 
that seek to remedy detrimental community conditions through sustained at-
tention and . . . therapeutic interventions with individual offenders who expe-
rience debilitating personal conditions.” Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at 
vii. Although there are various models for drug courts, the majority (fifty-eight 
percent) follow a post-plea model. HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 
1. 
 37. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 2 (finding drug courts both 
successful at engaging and retaining felony offenders and cost-effective); David 
J. Hanson, DWI Courts: Effectively Addressing Drunk Driving, in PROBLEM-
SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 73, 84 (Paul 
Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding DUI court participants 
four times less likely to receive another DUI than non-DUI court participants); 
Mitchell B. Mackinem & Paul Higgins, Adult Drug Courts: A Hope Realized?, 
in PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 33, 
41 (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (finding an average re-
duction of thirty-two percent in recidivism as compared to non-drug court par-
ticipants). See generally HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 9–10 
(synthesizing various research on the effectiveness of drug courts at both re-
ducing crime and saving the government money). 
FISHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:24 PM 
2014] DRUG COURT SANCTIONS 755 
 
cy.38 The growth in drug courts may also reflect a broader tran-
sition from punitive and retributive punishment to therapeutic 
and restorative justice,39 reflected in the most recent drafts of 
the Model Penal Code.40 Research repeatedly focuses on reduc-
tions in recidivism and cost saving to the government.41 But the 
National Drug Court Institute recognizes that there is less re-
search regarding the structural design of drug court programs 
and the application of sanctions to court participants.42 
Principles such as collaboration, enhanced information, 
community engagement, individualized justice, accountability, 
and treatment outcomes universally guide drug courts,43 but 
the implementation of courts varies dramatically state-to-
state.44 To ensure participant accountability and eventual 
graduation from—or completion of—drug courts, all drug courts 
administer graduated sanctions, a system of increasingly ad-
verse consequences for subsequent violations,45 to respond to 
violations of the drug court contract.46 Sanctions are defined as 
penalties, “specified or in the form of moral pressure, that act[] 
to ensure compliance or conformity.”47 The entire drug court 
 
 38. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 15.  
 39. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at viii; see also MILLER & 
JOHNSON, supra note 29, at 19 (noting that problem-solving courts derive from 
multiple legal positions, including legal pragmatism, therapeutic jurispru-
dence, law-and-literature, and legal realism). Although problem-solving courts 
arguably derive from many legal positions, this Note assumes that therapeutic 
and restorative justice are the guiding principles of problem-solving courts.  
 40. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, reporters’ intro. at xx-xxiii (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 3, 2014) (on file with author). 
 41. See, e.g., MCVAY, supra note 26, at 6–10. 
 42. TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 5, 6 (noting the need to assess 
“the structural design of drug court programs” and the varying application and 
rules regarding sanctions).  
 43. See Berman, supra note 27, at 2–3 (listing underlying principles); 
Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 7, at viii (discussing the importance of col-
laboration). 
 44. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 1. 
 45. Adele Harrell & John Roman, Reducing Drug Use and Crime Among 
Offenders: The Impact of Graduated Sanctions, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 207, 209 
(2001). For a history of the meaning of the term graduated sanctions see Faye 
S. Taxman et al., Graduated Sanctions: Stepping Into Accountable Systems 
and Offenders, 79 PRISON J. 182, 184–86 (1999).  
 46. See TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6 (“The application of sanc-
tions and incentives is universal among drug courts . . . .”); Christine H. Lind-
quist et al., Sanctions and Rewards in Drug Court Programs: Implementation, 
Perceived Efficacy, and Decision Making, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 119, 120 (2006). 
 47. AM. CORR. ASS’N, RECLAIMING OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY: INTER-
MEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS 5 (Edward E. 
Rhine ed., 1993). 
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team—including the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, proba-
tion officer, and treatment liaison—typically determines sanc-
tions.48 Although sanctions are a part of every drug court’s pro-
gram, the “rules governing their application vary.”49  
The diversity of sanctions used in drug courts exceeds 
sanctions traditionally used in courts, probation, and parole.50 
Although all drug courts rely on some form of graduated sanc-
tions, potential sanctions range from a verbal reprimand or 
writing an essay to civil contempt, jail time, or termination 
from the court.51 In particular, the use of jail as a sanction var-
ies considerably, with some programs recommending no more 
than five days in jail, others no more than thirty, and many 
more with no ceiling on jail time.52 This can lead to arbitrary or 
excessive punishment, undermining drug courts’ validity and 
therapeutic efficacy.53  
Another variation between drug courts is the predictability 
of sanctions. In some drug courts, the participation contract 
outlines violations and the sanctions they trigger.54 In many 
 
 48. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 139. 
 49. TAUBER & SNAVELY, supra note 5, at 6. 
 50. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 141. 
 51. See id. at 130 tbl.3; List of Incentives and Sanctions, NATIONAL DRUG 
COURT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.ndcrc.org/content/list-incentives-and 
-sanctions (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Sanctions and Incentives from Opera-
tional Drug Courts Throughout the Nation, AM. U. JUST. PROGRAMS OFF., 
http://jpo.wrlc.org//handle/11204/2388 (follow “3022.pdf” hyperlink) (last visit-
ed Nov. 2, 2014). 
 52. See, e.g., Denver Drug Court Incentives and Sanctions Guidelines, 
NAT’L DRUG CT. RESOURCE CENTER, http://live-ndcrc-nadcp.gotpantheon.com/ 
content/denver-drug-court-incentives-and-sanctions-guidelines (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2014) (thirty days maximum); List of Incentives and Sanctions, supra 
note 51 (five days maximum); RHODE ISLAND ADULT DRUG COURT, CONTRACT, 
http://www.courts.ri.gov/PublicResources/forms/Superior%20Court%20Forms/
Adult%20Drug%20Court%20-%20Contract.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (no 
maximum jail time). 
 53. See, e.g., This American Life: Very Tough Love (Mar. 25, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/sites/default/files/TAL430_transcript 
.pdf (describing a particularly punitive drug court, where the judge imposed 
sanctions and jail sentences far more severe than the original charge permit-
ted).  
 54. See, e.g., DRUG COURT: DEFENSE PACKET MATERIALS, available at 
http://www.co.clark.wa.us/courts/documents/DRUGCOURTOPT-INPACKET 
.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2014) (differentiating sanctions based on the num-
ber of positive urinalyses and the phase of the drug court program the partici-
pant is in); see also Jeremy Travis, But They All Come Back: Rethinking Pris-
oner Reentry, SENT’G & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5 (May 
2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181413.pdf (describing 
drug court contract with specified sanctions). 
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others, however, the drug court agreement (or “contract”) is si-
lent on when sanctions will be imposed, leaving broad discre-
tion with the judge and team to determine sanctions on a case-
by-case basis.55 Both appellate courts and academics have chal-
lenged the variability in sanctions and termination from the 
court, currently undermining the legitimacy of problem-solving 
courts.56 Ultimately, this variability raises the question: What 
procedure is best for both the participant and society as a 
whole? 
C. CHALLENGES FACING TRADITIONAL PROBATION  
The need for probation violation reform has been recog-
nized in traditional probation system. Sanctions are also an in-
creasingly key component of probation and parole, and innova-
tions in probation and parole can inform drug court procedures. 
Probation and parole violations contribute from thirty to eighty 
percent of new prison intakes and account for more than half of 
the growth in the correctional population since 1990.57 Proba-
tion revocation policies therefore have a “significant impact on 
 
 55. See Dunson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“Decisions to terminate from Drug Court are made on a case-by-case basis 
and are not made according to precise guidelines.”); DRUG COURT AGREEMENT, 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., available at http://www.montgomerycountymd 
.gov/circuitcourt/resources/files/drugcourtagreementrevised.pdf (silent on 
sanctions); see also William M. Burdon et al., Drug Courts and Contingency 
Management, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 73, 78 (2001) (criticizing the imbalance be-
tween sanctions and rewards in active drug courts); Lindquist et al., supra 
note 46, at 133 (finding that the majority of judges preferred individualization 
of sanctions, based in part upon the participant’s compliance with the spirit of 
the program and commitment to recovery). 
 56. Harold Pollack et al., How To Make Drug Court Work, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 26, 2013 11:14 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2013/04/26/how-to-make-drug-courts-work (arguing that sanctions can include 
lengthy terms of confinement and exceed traditional sentences). But see State 
v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008) (stating that the state supreme 
court has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner in which the [drug 
court] administrators execute the rules and regulations of the [drug court]”). 
 57. See, e.g., Faye S. Taxman et al., Graduated Sanctions: Stepping Into 
Accountable Systems and Offenders, 79 PRISON J. 182, 183 (1999); Angela 
Hawken & Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift 
and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
(Dec. 2, 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
229023.pdf; see also Sadhbh Walshe, Probation and Parole: A Study in Crimi-
nal Justice Dysfunction, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2012 3:50 30 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/apr/26/probation 
-parole-study-dysfunction (finding that probation and parole violations ac-
counted for over one-third of prison admissions in 2005, half due to new crimes 
and half due to technical violations of terms of release). 
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[the] prison population.”58 As the probation system lacks effi-
cient means to adjudicate single violations, the imposition of 
sanctions rarely occurs in traditional probation, and when im-
posed, sanctions tend to be “too rare and too delayed.”59 When 
probationers can get away with violating the terms of probation 
without immediate consequence, they are less likely to comply 
with those conditions.60 Because over half of probationers fail to 
comply with the terms of their release, there has been a move-
ment toward graduated sanctions for violations of probation 
conditions.61 
Graduated sanctions were introduced to increase compli-
ance in traditional probation. The key deterrence principles of 
“certainty, swiftness, and progressiveness” guide graduated 
sanctions.62 A predetermined sanctions “menu,” which forms a 
behavioral contract, outlines and mandates given sanctions.63 
The reduced discretion increases the certainty of the sanctions. 
In 2004, Hawaii became the first state to implement significant 
probation reform, through Project HOPE.64 Project HOPE is a 
high-intensity supervision program characterized by swift, pre-
dictable, and immediate sanctions for detected violations.65 Pro-
ject HOPE has been referred to as a coerced abstinence pro-
gram and is not as therapeutically focused or intensive as drug 
courts.66 Project HOPE includes five significant innovations in 
the field of probation:  
(1) an initial warning hearing, which informs participants 
each violation will result in jail time;  
 
 58. AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 47, at vi. 
 59. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 6; see also AM. CORR. ASS’N, su-
pra note 47, at 6 (“[T]he messages we send can make all the difference be-
tween effective supervision and setting offenders up for failure.”); Steven S. 
Alm, A New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. REV. 1181, 1184 
(2013) (suggesting that probation officers often delay administering sanctions 
until the offender can be characterized as “not amenable to probation”); Tax-
man et al., supra note 45, at 189 (arguing that when violations are not imme-
diately addressed, offenders are less likely to adhere to conditions of proba-
tion). 
 60. See Taxman et al., supra note 45, at 189.  
 61. Id. at 184–85. 
 62. Id. at 187.  
 63. Id. at 190. 
 64. Hope Probation, HAWAII ST. JUDICIARY, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/ 
special_projects/hope/about_hope_probation.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); 
see also Alm, supra note 59, at 1185.  
 65. Id.  
 66. See HUDDLESTON & MARLOWE, supra note 31, at 17. 
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(2) swift hearings following violations; 
(3) treatment for those who cannot stop using drugs or al-
cohol on their own;67 
(4) the ability of judges to supervise large numbers of pro-
bationers; and 
(5) targeting the toughest populations.68  
Participation in Project HOPE reduces the likelihood of recidi-
vism and probation revocation.69 Due to these successes, Project 
HOPE currently serves as a model for probation reform. 
Traditionally, punitive punishment has not been effective 
at reducing incarceration rates for individuals on probation or 
individuals struggling with severe substance use disorder.70 
Fortunately, the movement toward graduated sanctions for 
probation violations, and diverting high-risk populations into 
drug courts, has proven that it is possible to lower the rates of 
incarceration and recidivism in historically highly incarcerated 
populations.71 Drug courts currently employ graduated sanc-
tions and progressive punishment, but not in a uniform way. A 
challenge facing drug courts is what sanction policy will facili-
tate recovery and reintegration for the largest possible number 
of offenders, without undermining public safety, and whether 
that sanction policy should be transparent and uniform. This 
challenge, and a possible solution for drug courts, is addressed 
below. 
 
 67. It is important to note that treatment is not a core component of Pro-
ject HOPE because Project HOPE is not specifically geared towards those who 
are addicted. Therefore, although parts of Project HOPE may inform sanctions 
in a drug court, the two systems are distinct and serve different needs. See id.  
 68. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185–86.  
 69. After one year, HOPE probationers were fifty-five percent less likely 
to be arrested for a new crime, seventy-two percent less likely to use drugs, 
sixty-one percent less likely to skip appointments with their probation officer, 
and fifty-three percent less likely to have their probation revoked. “Swift and 
Certain” Sanctions in Probation Are Highly Effective: Evaluation of the HOPE 
Program, NAT’L. INST. JUST. (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter Swift and Certain], 
http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/community/drug-offenders/Pages/hawaii 
-hope.aspx.  
 70. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (“If [addicts] have a brain disease, 
imprisoning them without treatment is futile. If they are left untreated, their 
recidivism rates to both crime and drug use are frighteningly high . . . .”). 
 71. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 37, at 41; Swift and Certain, su-
pra note 69. 
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II.  ATTEMPTS TO INTEGRATE KNOWLEDGE OF 
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER AND DETERRENCE 
PRINCIPLES INTO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM   
Recently, there has been significant reform in the admin-
istration of sanctions in both probation and problem-solving 
courts.72 Section A analyzes the use of graduated sanctions in 
probation, illustrated through Project HOPE. Section A con-
cludes that although Project HOPE should inform drug court 
procedure, because Project HOPE does not specifically serve of-
fenders suffering from severe substance use disorder, it should 
not be the sole model for sanctions in drug courts. Section B 
discusses the wide array of sanctions currently used in drug 
courts and the ways in which many of those sanctions do not 
align with current medical knowledge of severe substance use 
disorder. 
A. A LESSON FROM PROBATION REFORM  
Project HOPE leads the reform movement in traditional 
probation. This Section analyzes the extent to which Project 
HOPE’s procedures should be incorporated into a model drug 
court. Subsection A.1 analyzes swift hearings following court 
violations and Subsection A.2 analyzes the extent to which Pro-
ject HOPE’s deterrence principles apply to a model drug court 
population. This Section concludes that swift hearings should 
be an essential component of drug court procedures, but sanc-
tions and deterrent principles must be modified to reflect the 
drug court population, as opposed to Project HOPE’s general 
population. 
1. The Importance of Swift and Certain Hearings 
Project HOPE’s success is due in part to its integration of 
deterrence theory into the probation program. The effectiveness 
of sanctions increases with the swiftness and certainty of the 
sanction.73 Project HOPE participants receive both swift and 
 
 72. See infra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 73. See Dale A. Parent, Structuring Policies To Address Sanctions for Ab-
sconders and Violators, in AM. CORR. ASS’N, supra note 47, at 7, 10; Harold G. 
Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of 
Punishment, 59 SOC. F. 471, 471 (1980); see also Raymond Paternoster, Deci-
sions To Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delinquency: 
Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 9 
(1989) (“The active decision maker is . . . repeatedly making offending deci-
sions, which may be affected by . . . an ongoing reassessment of sanction 
threats.”). 
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certain sanctions following violations. The general principle 
that guides the warning hearing and swift hearings is con-
sistency.74 Participants are told at the warning hearing that 
they “can count on a jail sanction for every violation.”75 Then, 
the general consistent message introduced at the warning hear-
ing is enforced through “swift hearings”76—over seventy percent 
of hearings are held within seventy-two hours of a detected vio-
lation.77 At those hearings, probationers are sentenced to a cer-
tain amount of time in jail, which increases with each succes-
sive violation.78 This is starkly different from the traditional 
probation response, where probation violations pile up until the 
court intervenes with a revocation hearing—a drastic re-
sponse—substantially after the initial violations.79 Project 
HOPE’s swift response and certainty of jail time moved away 
from the traditional revocation hearing response, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of compliance with probation condi-
tions.80  
Although Project HOPE has been incredibly successful for 
populations of offenders that previously violated probation, es-
pecially individuals charged with serious felonies, it is not ex-
plicitly for individuals suffering from severe substance use dis-
order.81 Recognizing the need for additional treatment and 
supervision for “chronically addicted offenders,” Hawaii has a 
separate drug court specifically for individuals with substance 
use disorder.82 Therefore, although some procedures in Project 
HOPE should inform drug court procedures, it is important to 
consider the underlying assumptions guiding the “swift” and 
“certain” response and whether those assumptions are as appli-
cable to a drug court population limited to individuals with se-
vere substance use disorder.  
 
 74. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186; Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, 
at 9. 
 75. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185 n.13. Those violations include, but are not 
limited to, failing a drug test, failing to meet with a probation officer, and not 
going to treatment. See, e.g., Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 56. 
 76. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Swift and Certain, supra note 69. 
 79. See, e.g., Taxman et al., supra note 45 (“The probation system’s failure 
to respond to noncompliant probationers encourages defiance by creating an 
environment that tolerates inattention to the importance of adherence to the 
release conditions.”). 
 80. See id. at 183.  
 81. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1187–88. 
 82. Id.  
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2. The (In)Applicability of Deterrence Principles to 
Individuals with Severe Substance Use Disorder 
The underlying assumption of deterrence theory—that an 
active and rational decision maker makes the choice to re-
offend or use based on a given sanction83—does not apply with 
the same force to individuals suffering from severe substance 
use disorder, who are unable to control the impulse to use a 
substance in response to certain stimuli.84 Severe substance use 
disorder is characterized by an “impairment in behavioral con-
trol, craving, [and] diminished recognition of significant prob-
lems with one’s behavior . . . .”85 There is a cognitive break 
down in reasoning that leads to “compulsive” use.86 Although 
Project HOPE participants receive jail time for every viola-
tion,87 the possibility of one night in jail may not effectively de-
ter an individual suffering from severe substance use disorder 
because that individual has less control over the impulse to use 
depending on the nature of the situation and relevant stimuli.88 
Additionally, spending time in jail does not treat the underly-
ing addiction and impulse to use drugs.89 Drug court sanctions 
must be implemented so that instead of merely punishing a 
person for relapsing—a predictable and compulsive act for an 
individual with severe substance use disorder—the sanctions 
treat and respond to the chemical addiction, especially during 
early phases of abstinence.90  
Project HOPE, however, does not implement “certain” 
sanctions solely for their deterrent effect. The other benefit of 
 
 83. Cf. Paternoster, supra note 73, at 9 (describing an active decision 
maker in the sanction evaluation process). 
 84. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 485 (describing an individual with se-
vere substance use as “chronically relapsing” and compulsively taking drugs).  
 85. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Addiction Med., supra note 19, at 1.  
 86. See Steven E. Hyman, The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for 
Voluntary Control of Behavior, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 8, 9–10 (2007) (discussing 
the impact of addictive drugs on the prefrontal cortex and cognitive control).  
 87. Alm, supra note 59, at 1185 n.13.  
 88. Cf. Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166 (describing how addictive 
drugs impact behavioral responses). That is not to say that jail is never an ap-
propriate sanction. Jail as a potential sanction has been a key component of 
the success of drug courts. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERI-
ENCE, supra note 22, at 86. As discussed in Part III, jail should be used in re-
sponse to certain violations. See infra Part III.  
 89. Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (“[I]f we know that criminals are drug 
addicted, it is no longer reasonable to simply incarcerate them. If they have a 
brain disease, imprisoning them without treatment is futile.”). 
 90. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46. 
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certain sanctions is that the certainty of the sanctions increases 
participants’ perception of a just and fair program.91 Procedural 
justice—the idea that participants are more likely to view the 
criminal justice system positively if they believe that their case 
was processed in a fair manner—also guides the certainty as-
pect of Project HOPE.92 This fairness increases compliance with 
the program and participants’ positive perception of the pro-
gram.93 Because drug court participants are likewise more like-
ly to comply if they believe they are being treated in a fair 
manner, it is important that the administration of sanctions in 
drug courts is guided by principles of procedural justice.94  
Drug courts currently utilize some, but not all, of the pro-
cedures implemented in Project HOPE.95 There are, however, 
elements from Project HOPE that should be integrated into 
drug court procedures to produce courts that are more effective. 
B. CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR ADMINISTERING SANCTIONS IN 
DRUG COURTS  
The procedures for administering sanctions vary greatly 
among drug courts. However, some general trends can guide a 
discussion of drug court sanctions. As is discussed below, the 
majority of drug courts do not have a written schedule of sanc-
tions or provide that schedule to participants,96 do not clearly 
differentiate between disease-driven and non-disease-driven 
acts when administering sanctions,97 and do not respond to vio-
lations as “swiftly” as Project HOPE.  
 
 91. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186.  
 92. Cf. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 
84–85 (describing procedural justice).  
 93. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186. 
 94. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 
85 (noting that drug court participants are more likely to comply with the pro-
gram if they believe they are being treated in a fair manner).  
 95. See, e.g., MINN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, MINNESOTA OFFENDER DRUG 
COURT STANDARDS 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.mncourts 
.gov/Documents/0/Public/Problem_Solving_Courts/Offender_Drug_Court_Stan
dards_-_031109.pdf (discussing behavioral contract, graduated sanctions, and 
swift hearings).  
 96. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 97. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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1. The Drug Court Contract 
Although most drug courts require a written contract to 
participate,98 the majority of those contracts do not include a 
schedule for the administration of sanctions.99 Written sched-
ules for sanctions are considered a “best practice” for drug 
courts, but “just under half of courts have written schedules of 
sanctions . . . and, only two-thirds of those that do provide their 
written schedules to the participants.”100 By not providing a 
“sanction menu” to drug court participants, drug courts are not 
ensuring a “certain” response, therefore decreasing the deter-
rent effect of sanctions and participants’ perception of fair-
ness.101 Evidence from Project HOPE suggests that the drug 
courts with high-predictability sanctions are the most likely to 
deter noncompliance with drug court conditions. However, em-
pirical evidence from the Multi-Site Drug Court Evaluation 
(MADCE) calls that assumption into question. 
Recognizing the array of outcome achievement among drug 
courts, the MADCE studied the impact of specific policies and 
practices on drug court participant outcomes.102 Data was com-
piled from the MADCE Adult Drug Court Survey and from in-
terviews with 1,781 offenders across twenty-three drug 
courts.103 The MADCE found that medium-predictability sanc-
tions (as opposed to high or low-predictability) have the great-
est impact on reducing crime and subsequent drug use.104  
The study on the predictability of sanctions105 found statis-
 
 98. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 54, at 5.  
 99. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 59 (finding that only 44.4% of drug 
courts have written schedules for sanctions, and only 67.1% of courts that do 
have a sanction menu publish that schedule to drug court participants); see, 
e.g., DRUG COURT AGREEMENT, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., available at 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/circuitcourt/resources/files/drugcourtagr
eementrevised.pdf (silent on sanctions).  
 100. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.  
 101. See Parent, supra note 73; Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, 
The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 Soc. F. 471, 471 
(1980); see also Paternoster, supra note 73, at 9 (“The active decision maker is 
repeatedly making offending decisions affected in part by an ongoing reas-
sessment of sanction threats.”). 
 102. SHELLI B. ROSSMAN ET AL., URBAN INST., 4 THE MULTI-SITE ADULT 
DRUG COURT EVALUATION: THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS 121–22 (Shelli B. 
Rossman et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter ROSSMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF DRUG 
COURTS]. For additional information on the study’s design methods see id. at 
122–24.  
 103. Id. at 124–25.  
 104. Id. at 144. 
 105. Id. at 140.  
FISHER_5fmt 11/30/2014 3:24 PM 
2014] DRUG COURT SANCTIONS 765 
 
tically significant differences between high-, medium-, and low-
predictability sanctions with regard to preventing drug use and 
criminal behavior.106 Medium-predictability courts were courts 
that formally communicated how and when participants would 
be sanctioned for non-compliance but retained some flexibility 
in applying the sanctioning schedule.107 Both medium-
predictability and low-predictability courts were over two times 
more likely to prevent criminal conduct than high-
predictability courts.108 And drug courts with medium-
predictability sanctions outranked both high-predictability and 
low-predictability courts at preventing substance use.109 This 
suggests that high-predictability sanctions, most similar to the 
Project HOPE model, are not the most effective at deterring 
crime and substance use with the drug court population. Per-
haps this is because medium- and low-predictability sanctions 
give the judge greater discretion to account for the medical as-
pect of violations and factor in medical knowledge to the admin-
istration of sanctions. Even given that discretion, medium-
predictability sanctions ensure the judge is accountable to par-
ticipants and responds within certain published limitations.  
2. Differentiating the Sanction Based on the Violation  
Recently, drug court scholars have criticized drug courts’ 
responses to certain violations.110 First, scholars have criticized 
drug courts’ response to relapse, the ultimate violation. Relapse 
is a daily threat for an addict, even one who has been sober for 
decades.111 Some scholars suggest that for individuals with se-
vere substance use disorder, relapse should be a time to give 
additional support rather than a time to punish.112 Therefore, in 
early stages of a drug court program, relapses should be re-
sponded to with increased treatment, not greater sanctions.113 
DSM-V classifies an individual as being in early remission if no 
 
 106. Id. at 144. 
 107. Id. at 5.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 144–51. 
 110. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe, Drug Court Practitioner Fact Sheet, 
Behavior Modification 101 for Drug Courts: Making the Most of Incentives and 
Sanctions, NAT’L DRUG CT. INST. (Sept. 2012), http://ndcrc.org/sites/default/ 
files/fact_sheets.pdf. 
 111. Travis, supra note 54, at 5. Therefore, a common saying in the recov-
ery community is live “a day at a time.” Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 5. 
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criteria for substance use disorder have been met for at least 
three months and as being in sustained remission if no criteria 
have been met for twelve months or longer.114 Once a partici-
pant has more sobriety time and has progressed past early re-
mission, the participant will have more control over their im-
pulse to use, and it may be more appropriate to sanction a 
relapse.  
Second, scholars have suggested administering sanctions 
based on the nature of the violation. For those drug courts that 
do provide a sanction menu to their participants, there is no in-
dication that any court explicitly differentiates sanctions based 
upon the nature of the violation and its relationship to sub-
stance use disorder.115 The activities most commonly sanctioned 
include: supplying a positive urinalysis; skipping a urinalysis; 
skipping treatment, a meeting, or an appointment; attitude; 
absconding; and receiving new charges.116 For an individual 
with severe substance use disorder in early remission, some of 
the listed sanctioned activities may be compulsive or addiction-
driven.117 For example, supplying a positive urinalysis or com-
mitting a new offense while under the influence would mean an 
individual has relapsed. But severe substance use disorder is a 
brain disease, characterized by a change in circuitry that hin-
ders the ability to control the craving to use.118 Therefore, pun-
ishing relapses may be inappropriate, especially for an individ-
ual in early remission.119 Depending on the participant, 
situation, and relevant stimuli, it may be impossible to deter a 
relapse in early recovery in an uncontrolled environment.120 
Therefore, punishment will not effectively reduce the criminal 
behavior and the underlying addiction. 
 
 114. DSM-V, supra note 19, at 491. The only criteria that may still be pre-
sent is having a “craving[ ] or strong desire” to use. Id.  
 115. This conclusion is based on my search of publicly available Drug Court 
contracts and the conclusions of the MADCE.  
 116. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 129. 
 117. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166. The National Drug 
Institute has recently recommended distinguishing between distal and proxi-
mal behavioral goals. Proximal behavioral goals are behaviors a participant is 
already capable of and should involve more severe sanctions than distal (long-
term) behavioral goals. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 7. 
 118. See supra Part I.A. 
 119. See Travis, supra note 54, at 5 (“The moment of relapse is an occasion 
to work harder to support the individual offender, not an occasion to shun or 
exile him.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166. 
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Additionally, independent of the decision to use, individu-
als with severe substance use disorder satisfy additional crite-
ria—such as the inability to fulfill obligations—that may hin-
der compliance with drug-court criteria including meeting with 
probation officers, supplying urinalyses, and attending court on 
a regular basis.121 These non-drug-related behavioral symptoms 
should also be addressed therapeutically where necessary, as 
opposed to punitively, if they result from the underlying medi-
cal condition. 
Courts that employ high-predictability sanctions, without 
an opportunity to vary the sanction based on the nature of the 
violation, lack the flexibility to respond therapeutically, as op-
posed to solely punitively. Because courts fail to respond thera-
peutically as necessary—decreasing the probability of absti-
nence and future criminal conduct—the majority of drug courts 
do not fulfill their role in the criminal justice system as effec-
tively as possible and, therefore, are arguably an unnecessary 
alternative to traditional probation.  
3. Swift and Not-So-Swift Hearings 
Although drug courts respond to probation violations more 
swiftly than the practice in traditional probation, they still re-
spond less swiftly than recommended by the Project HOPE 
model. The majority of Project HOPE participants are brought 
before the court within seventy-two hours of any violation.122 
When responding to positive drug tests, forty-eight percent of 
drug courts sanction an individual within one week of a viola-
tion, whereas forty-one percent wait until the participant’s next 
court appearance, which could be anywhere from a few days to 
a month away.123 For sanctions for infractions other than posi-
tive drug tests, more courts tend to wait until the next court 
hearing.124 This delay decreases the deterrence effect of the 
sanctions and therefore the efficacy of the drug court.  
Drug courts have made substantial strides toward improv-
ing probation outcomes for drug offenders, but there is room for 
improvement. Drug courts should internalize the lessons from 
Project HOPE and apply Project HOPE’s procedure and philos-
ophy to the drug court population. By integrating knowledge of 
 
 121. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84 (listing an inability to fulfill ob-
ligations as one criteria of substance use disorder). 
 122. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 13. 
 123. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 60. 
 124. Id. at 61–62.  
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substance use disorder, deterrence principles, and procedural 
justice to the administration of sanctions, drug courts can more 
effectively combat addiction and its correlation to criminal ac-
tivity. 
III.  INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE OF SUBSTANCE USE 
DISORDER INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SANCTIONS 
IN DRUG COURTS   
Now that the scientific community has greater knowledge 
of the nature of substance use disorder and its impact on be-
haviors, this knowledge should be incorporated into the admin-
istration of sanctions in drug courts. To the extent it is possible 
to deter addicts from relapsing or violating conditions of the 
court, drug courts should integrate principles of deterrence the-
ory. However, drug courts must also maintain a therapeutic 
component and respond in a medically appropriate manner to 
violations that result from the disease of substance use disor-
der. The major areas in which drug court sanction administra-
tion should be clarified are the initial behavioral contract and 
the sanction menu, which will be discussed in Section A and 
Section B, respectively. Section C discusses the impact the pro-
posed contract and sanction menu will have on the appellate 
process. Section D concludes by addressing some possible chal-
lenges to this Note’s solution and why the proposed procedure 
is preferable to those currently utilized by drug courts. 
A. THE BEHAVIORAL CONTRACT 
The majority of drug courts, similar to Project HOPE, re-
quire a behavioral contract for participation.125 However, most 
contracts do not inform participants of the potential sanctions 
for violating the contract.126 By not specifying the potential 
sanctions in the contract, drugs courts reduce the deterrent ef-
fect of sanctions and decrease the perception of procedural jus-
tice in the drug courts. 
Sanctions have the greatest deterrent effect if they are cer-
tain.127 Project HOPE has exemplified that the presence of a 
behavioral contract that outlines key sanctions can have a sig-
nificant impact on compliance with probation procedures.128 
 
 125. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. Interestingly, two-thirds of those con-
tracts require a waiver of rights to challenge the procedures. Id.  
 126. Id. at 5.  
 127. Taxman et al., supra note 57, at 187.  
 128. Swift and Certain, supra note 69. 
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Currently, the majority of drug courts do not include a sanction 
menu similar to Project HOPE. If there is no sanction menu, or 
the sanction menu is never shared with drug court partici-
pants, participants will not be certain of whether their actions 
will result in a sanction. Therefore, they are less likely to be de-
terred from violating a condition of the drug court where deter-
rence is more probable. Drug courts should incorporate some 
principles from Project HOPE to increase the deterrent effect of 
sanctions, specifically the language from the “warning hear-
ing.”  
At a Project HOPE warning hearing, the sanctions for vio-
lating conditions of probation are clearly communicated to 
court participants. The warning hearing includes the following 
messages: 
“I think you can succeed on probation . . . .”
129
 
“You are the one responsible for making sure that you comply with 
your conditions of probation . . . . [Y]ou are making a deal with me to 
follow the rules.”
130
  
“You are being brought here to court today so I can clearly spell out 
what the consequences will be if you don’t follow the rules of proba-
tion.”
131
 
“[I]f you fail a drug test, if you fail to meet with your probation officer 
when you are supposed to, or you fail with other terms of your proba-
tion, such as not getting an assessment, not going to treatment, etc.—
you will go to jail.”
132
 
“[I]f you violate the rules, there will be consequences, and they will 
happen right away. But it’s all about choices.”
133
  
Participants of Project HOPE are successful in part because 
they know the consequences of their actions—they know that 
every violation of a probation condition will result in time in 
jail.134 The certainty increases both the deterrent effect of the 
sanction and the perception of procedural justice because every 
participant is subject to the same warning hearing and the 
same sanctions. Many of the messages in Project HOPE’s warn-
ing hearing should also be conveyed to drug court participants 
through the behavioral contract and an initial hearing.  
The drug court contract must, however, account for the fact 
that it is serving a different population than that present in 
 
 129. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 56. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 57. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. See Alm, supra note 59, at 1186.  
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Project HOPE. The sanction menu this Note proposes is de-
signed for drug courts limited to participants with severe sub-
stance use disorder and therefore less able to control to impulse 
to use in early and sustained remission.135 Although the Project 
HOPE warning hearing states “it’s all about choices,”136 re-
search has established that an individual with severe sub-
stance use disorder experiences a change in brain chemistry 
that affects their ability to make rational choices regarding 
use.137 Therefore, a behavioral contract for drug courts should 
convey that non-disease-driven violations will be responded to 
with a certain sanction (such as a limited amount of jail time). 
In contrast, disease-driven violations—or violations that result 
from an inability to respond rationally to certain stimuli—will 
be responded to with increased therapeutic treatment. A sam-
ple behavioral contract for a drug court could include the fol-
lowing language:  
  I think you can succeed in drug court. You are here to address 
both your underlying disease and the criminal behavior that has re-
sulted from that disease. You are responsible for your success and en-
suring that you follow the rules of this court.  
  You are making a deal with me to follow the rules of this court. 
You are being brought  here today so that I can tell you what the vari-
ous consequences will be if you do not comply with the conditions of 
this court.  
  However, you are in drug court because you have a medical dis-
ease. In order to recover from that disease, you must rewire your 
brain chemistry. This can take time. If you violate the conditions of 
this drug court because of the compulsive nature of your disease, we 
will respond therapeutically. This will likely mean more intensive 
treatment and will be based on the recommendation of medical pro-
fessionals. However, if you are in sustained remission, choose to use 
non-compulsively, or violate a condition of this court non-
compulsively, you will go to jail.   
  If you violate a condition of your participation in this court, there 
will be a response. It may be a sanction or it may be increased thera-
py. But either way it will happen right away. The responses of this 
court will be based on your choices and actions.  
This sample contract is modeled after the warning hearing 
administered to Project HOPE participants,138 but accounts for 
the fact that drug courts serve individuals who are suffering 
from a disease and have less control over certain choices in the 
early phases of the drug court program and recovery. There-
 
 135. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 136. Hawken & Kleiman, supra note 57, at 57. 
 137. See supra Part I.A. 
 138. See Hawken & Kleinman, supra note 57, at 56–58. 
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fore, instead of referring to relapse consequences as sanctions—
implying that the participant has done something wrong—
relapse consequences are referred to as therapeutic responses. 
This semantic distinction accounts for scientific literature that 
addicted individuals cannot control the urge to use in response 
to certain stimuli,139 and so the court response to disease-driven 
violations should be distinct from the court response to non-
disease-driven violations. 
The sample contract also aligns with the best practices 
found in the MADCE study.140 Courts with high-predictability 
sanctions have a sanction menu, publish the menu to partici-
pants, and the menu is (almost) always followed by the judge.141 
High-predictability courts are most similar to Project HOPE 
but were less effective with the drug court population.142 By 
contrast, medium-predictability courts, or courts that had a 
sanction menu but either did not publish the sanction menu or 
allowed the judge greater discretion when administering sanc-
tions, were the most effective.143 Therefore, the behavioral con-
tract should be classified as “medium predictability” and state 
that non-disease-driven violations will be responded to with a 
specific, limited sanction, whereas the judge will have more 
discretion when responding to disease-driven violations.  
Having a transparent contract will also increase the per-
ception of procedural justice among drug court participants. 
Drug court participants are more likely to comply with the pro-
gram if they feel as though they are being treated in a fair and 
consistent manner.144 The behavioral contract makes clear that 
every non-disease-driven violation will be responded to with a 
sanction. In a study, the threat of jail was found the most effec-
tive sanction by both court participants and staff.145 Therefore, 
similar to findings by Project HOPE, jail is the most appropri-
ate sanction for those behaviors that can be deterred and do not 
require a therapeutic response. The study likewise found that 
 
 139. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166. 
 140. The MADCE study discussed in Part II.B found that high-
predictability sanctions were less effective than both medium-predictability 
and low-predictability sanctions at preventing relapse and criminal activity. 
See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.  
 141. See ROSSMAN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF DRUG COURTS, supra note 102, at 
140, 144. 
 142. Id. at 144–51. 
 143. Id.  
 144. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 85.  
 145. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 132. 
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the majority of participants thought sanctions should be tai-
lored to the individual.146 The contract accounts for that indi-
vidualization by granting more flexibility with regard to dis-
ease-driven violations. The behavioral contract should go on to 
clarify what the specific sanctions and therapeutic responses 
may be, in order to bolster both its deterrent effect and the per-
ception of procedural justice.  
B. DIFFERENTIATING COURT RESPONSES BASED ON THE 
NATURE OF THE VIOLATION 
The behavioral contract should also outline the specific 
sanctions and therapeutic responses to various violations of 
drug court conditions. When the consequences are outlined, 
participants are more likely to be deterred from violating drug-
court conditions—because the consequences are certain—and 
are also more likely to view the drug court as fair.  
1. The Disease-Driven v. Non-Disease-Driven Distinction 
Currently, the majority of drug courts do not distinguish 
between therapeutic responses and sanctions for court viola-
tions in their behavioral contract. For example, the majority of 
drug courts “sanction” every positive urinalysis.147 But punish-
ing an individual with severe substance use disorder for a pre-
dictable manifestation of their disease does not align with the 
medical community’s knowledge of addiction and what behav-
iors are capable of being deterred. Instead, drug court conse-
quences should be divided into two categories—disease-driven 
and non-disease-driven violations. This distinction would ad-
dress the underlying tension between punishing the “sick” ad-
dict and punishing the “criminal” offender.148 Recognizing this 
distinction would also increase the likelihood of participant 
success in drug court programs because many behavioral goals 
are unattainable in early recovery.149 Drug courts should sup-
port the struggling addict, as opposed to merely punishing the 
violation, thereby enhancing the therapeutic component of the 
program and the likelihood of recovery for participants.  
Whether a violation is disease-driven or non-disease-driven 
should be medically determined. In determining whether an act 
 
 146. Id. at 133. 
 147. ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 60. 
 148. See Mackinem & Higgins, supra note 37, at 36.  
 149. Cf. Marlowe, supra note 110, at 5 (explaining that substance-
dependent individuals need time and effort to achieve sustained sobriety). 
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was disease-driven, the medical professional member of the 
drug court team would assess whether the act was compul-
sive.150 The medical professional would consider similar criteria 
to that used in diagnosing severe substance use disorder, in-
cluding whether there was a strong craving, whether the viola-
tion was in response to a stimuli that is associated with use, 
and whether the substance use was chosen over an important 
social or occupational activity.151 Because the drug court team 
includes treatment providers, the treatment provider should 
make a recommendation, based on their medical judgment to 
the judge as to whether the violation was disease-driven.152 This 
procedure will not only clarify the roles of various members of 
the drug court team but will also ensure drug courts are re-
sponding medically where necessary—an essential reason justi-
fying their development as an alternative to traditional proba-
tion. The next question that arises is what those various 
therapeutic responses should be. 
2. Possible Therapeutic and Punitive Responses  
Most drug courts provide a range of treatment modalities, 
ranging from inpatient treatment to counseling and relapse 
prevention.153 For repeated disease-driven violations, partici-
pants should be warned that they will be moved to a more in-
tensive treatment regimen. For example, someone in counsel-
ing would move to outpatient treatment, and someone in 
outpatient treatment would move to inpatient treatment. The 
fact that the increase in treatment would be judicially coerced 
does not undermine the effectiveness of the treatment.154 Inten-
sifying the treatment regimen would both serve as a judicial 
response to court violations and ensure the participant is get-
ting the level of treatment they need to abstain from using. In 
early remission, abstinence may need to be coerced via a con-
trolled environment, and responding therapeutically will give 
 
 150. Cf. Hyman, supra note 86, at 9 (stating that modern definitions of ad-
diction focus on issue of voluntarily control and compulsive use). 
 151. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 491.  
 152. See, e.g., ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. Typically, the entire drug 
court team, including the judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, treatment liai-
son, and drug court program provider, determines sanctions. Lindquist et al., 
supra note 46, at 139–40. The judge, however, has the final say in what sanc-
tion will be administered. Id.  
 153. See, e.g., ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 4, 48–53. 
 154. ROSSMAN ET AL., THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE, supra note 22, at 45. 
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the court the tools it needs to ensure it provides optimal thera-
peutic responses as necessary. 
However, before the serious consequence of intensifying 
treatment regimens, the court and treatment provider should 
have greater flexibility in administering therapeutic conse-
quences. Other therapeutic responses could include writing a 
letter of apology or essay, journaling, a life skills assignment, 
community service, observing a victim impact panel, or visiting 
a morgue.155 Each of those therapeutic responses would educate 
the participant about the underlying nature of their substance 
use disorder and help change the participant’s response to be-
havioral and social cues that previously triggered using.156 The 
behavioral contract should list these possible consequences and 
the ultimate therapeutic consequence of increasing the treat-
ment regimen.  
Jail should not be the presumed response to disease-driven 
violations. Jail is currently the most common sanction adminis-
tered in drug courts, followed by increased treatment.157 How-
ever, as discussed above, jail does not treat the underlying ad-
diction or change brain chemistry.158 And, depending on the 
stimuli and environment leading to relapse, jail will not effec-
tively deter an individual in early remission from using.159 
Therefore, jail should be reserved as a sanction for those viola-
tions that are non-disease-driven, not as a therapeutic response 
to relapse in early remission. 
Although the consequences for violations will not be as 
“certain” as those for Project HOPE participants because it will 
vary based on the participant’s therapeutic needs, all partici-
pants will know that there will be a response to disease-driven 
violations by the court, including relapse. That response will be 
based on a medical recommendation and tailored to the indi-
vidual participant. Further, the response will address their un-
 
 155. These possible therapeutic responses are derived from a list of sanc-
tions provided by the National Drug Court Research Center. They are all 
listed as sanctions, not as therapeutic responses. Each of these sanctions is 
considered low or moderate severity. See List of Incentives and Sanctions, su-
pra note 51.  
 156. See Leshner, supra note 19, at 46 (noting that treatment must not on-
ly treat the disease, but also behavioral and social cues).  
 157. Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 130 (listing sanctions from most to 
least common). 
 158. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 159. See, e.g., Kalivas & O’Brien, supra note 14, at 166. 
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derlying medical condition. This uniformity will enhance the 
perception of procedural justice. 
Non-disease-driven violations can be addressed more uni-
formly in the behavioral contract. Responses to non-disease-
driven violations should be referred to as sanctions, to distin-
guish them from the therapeutic responses discussed above. 
Sanctions should be presumed for individuals in sustained re-
mission or for non-disease-driven violations. Because drug 
court participants in sustained remission act more rationally 
than compulsively, deterrence theory and Project HOPE should 
guide the sanction menu. Therefore, those sanctions should be 
certain, administered swiftly, and progressive. Because jail is 
the most effective deterrent, similar to Project HOPE every 
voluntary violation should be sanctioned with a brief time in 
jail.160 This sanction should be included in the initial behavioral 
contract.  
The responses must also be swift. The majority of Project 
HOPE participants are brought before the court within seven-
ty-two hours of violations, whereas the same cannot be said of 
drug court participants.161 To improve the efficacy of sanctions, 
the hearings should be held as soon as possible or at least with-
in the seventy-two hour period used by Project HOPE.162  Wait-
ing until the next court appearance, perhaps a month or more 
away, will not maximize court efficacy or sufficiently differenti-
ate drug courts from traditional probation. 
These distinctions should be incorporated into the behav-
ioral contract discussed above. The behavioral contract should 
clearly outline the responses to various violations and set limi-
tations on judicial discretion. The contract should state that the 
court will respond differently to violations that are disease-
driven and non-disease-driven, and violations by individuals in 
early remission versus sustained remission or remission. The 
contract should also state what those responses will be to a cer-
tain extent but leave room for therapeutic modifications based 
on the needs of the participants. A model behavioral contract 
could include the following language:  
 
 160. See Lindquist et al., supra note 46, at 132. 
 161. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 162. This will of course add additional burdens on the court system and 
could be a source of criticism. However, my proposal is limited to those drug 
courts that serve individuals with severe substance use disorder. By limiting 
the number of participants drug courts serve—and serving only those who 
need the therapeutic component the most—drug courts could more effectively 
use their resources and reduce the cost of the programs. 
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  You are in drug court because you are addicted to a substance. In 
this court, we want to help treat that underlying addiction so that you 
can become sober, a productive member of society, and stop commit-
ting crimes. However, we recognize that in early recovery complete 
abstinence is not always possible. You have a chemical response in 
your brain that reduces your ability to control using. If you violate the 
terms of this program because of that underlying chemical response, 
we will respond therapeutically, based on the recommendation of the 
treatment provider. That response may include: writing a letter of 
apology or essay, journaling, a life skills assignment, community ser-
vice, observing a victim impact panel, or visiting a morgue. If you con-
tinue to violate conditions as a result  of your substance use disorder, 
we will increase your treatment regimen.  
  However, your disease does not insulate you from responsibility 
for your behaviors. If you violate a condition of this court non-
compulsively, you will go to jail, at first for one night and for increas-
ingly longer periods of time for additional violations (up to a prede-
termined limit).
163
 Also, once you have been symptom-free for twelve 
months and are in remission, you will have more tools to control the 
desire to use. If you use at that point, you will be sent to jail. Between 
three and twelve months there will be a presumption you could con-
trol the desire to use—although a medical professional may rebut that 
presumption—and you will likewise be sent to jail for using. Whether 
you are able to  control your consumption will be based on the recom-
mendation of your treatment provider and on your remission status. 
This model behavioral contract would go on to include a 
sanction menu, outlining the various sanctions and therapeutic 
responses of the drug court. By stating that violations for non-
disease-driven acts will result in jail time, the court will deter 
those behaviors that are most readily deterred. Also, because 
jail time is a sanction administered to every person for non-
disease-driven violations, the process will be viewed as fair and 
participants will be more likely to comply with the conditions of 
the court.  
The contract also differentiates between disease-driven 
and non-disease-driven violations and therefore clarifies the 
dueling roles of the drug court: treating the addiction and pun-
ishing the offender. The participant will be informed that the 
court does not intend to punish him or her for acts that directly 
result from severe substance use disorder—a medical illness he 
 
 163. It is important that the court sets a limit on the number of days spent 
in jail. There are horror stories of drug courts that send people to jail as a 
sanction and leave them in jail for longer than they would have been held if 
they had been sentenced in a traditional court. See This American Life: Very 
Tough Love, supra note 53. These stories undermine the validity of the drug 
courts and their ability to therapeutically respond to offenders. This Note 
would tentatively recommend a maximum jail limit of thirty days as a sanc-
tion, prior to considering expulsion from drug court. 
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or she cannot control in certain situations. Instead, the court 
wants to help treat the addiction. There is less need for uni-
formity in therapeutic responses because the behavior is not 
capable of being deterred and treatment must be tailored to the 
individual. However, the procedure will likely be viewed as fair 
because every participant will receive a therapeutic response 
for disease-driven violations, leading up to a more intense 
treatment regimen.  
C. APPELLATE REVIEW  
A final benefit of the behavioral contract is that it provides 
clear guiding principles for appellate courts that are reviewing 
the decisions of drug courts. As mentioned before, appellate 
courts are currently wary to question the judgments of drug 
court judges regarding sanctions and court termination. For 
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that it 
has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner in which 
the [drug court] administrators execute the rules and regula-
tions of the [drug court].”164 Other courts have questioned 
whether therapeutic decisions need to be on the record165 or if 
participants are guaranteed the minimal due process protec-
tions of revocation hearings.166 Some drug court contracts even 
require participants to relinquish all rights to an appeal or 
challenge of any court processes.167 Appellate courts’ wariness 
to question the decisions of drug courts stems in part from the 
lack of guiding principles regarding sanctions and court termi-
nation.  
This Note’s solution provides both drug courts and appel-
late courts with the tools to ensure procedural justice for partic-
ipants and adequate review on appeal. First, the drug court 
will be constrained by the sanctions limited in the behavior 
contract. Second, therapeutic responses must be documented by 
the opinion of the medical professional on the drug court team. 
Because sanctioning decisions will have to be grounded in a 
medical determination, appellate courts will be able to deter-
 
 164. State v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008).  
 165. E.g., In re Tyler T., 781 N.W.2d 922, 925 n.15 (Neb. 2010) (citing 
Torres v. Berbary, 340 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2003); Harris v. Commonwealth, 689 
S.E.2d 713 (Va. 2010); State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881 (Idaho 2007); People v. 
Anderson, 833 N.E.2d 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); State v. Cassill–Skilton, 94 P.3d 
407 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 166. Barrickman v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-000890-MR, 2006 WL 
73464, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2006). 
 167. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1, at 76. 
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mine whether the sanction or therapeutic response was appro-
priate, based on the record, the behavioral contract, the sanc-
tion menu, and a consideration of the underlying purposes of 
rehabilitation and crime prevention. 
Drug court behavioral contracts should outline the expec-
tations for participants and the possible sanctions that will be 
administered. However, the contract should also distinguish 
between sanctions and therapeutic responses and give exam-
ples of possible drug court responses in each of those categories. 
Such a contract will deter where deterrence is possible, uphold 
the underlying purposes of treating addiction and reducing 
crime, increase the perception of procedural justice by drug 
court participants, and provide appellate courts with specific 
guidance when reviewing drug court case dispositions.  
D. SOME POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND RESPONSES TO THOSE 
CONCERNS  
The solution proposed by this Note is subject to two dis-
tinct but interconnected concerns. The first issue is that it is 
hard to determine whether an act is disease- or non-disease-
driven, and this solution will not add clarity or consistency to 
the current system. Building on the first concern, the second 
concern is that the implementation of therapeutic responses, as 
opposed to punitive responses, will allow offenders to abuse the 
system and fail to change their behaviors.  
The first possible criticism is that a medical professional 
will be unable to determine whether an action is disease-driven 
or non-disease-driven. This concern, however, may have carried 
more weight prior to the implementation of DSM-V. DSM-V 
lists eleven specific actions that constitute symptoms of sub-
stance use disorder.168 Assuming that the disease model correct-
ly captures addiction, medical professionals should be able to 
apply the DSM-V criteria for substance use disorder to deter-
mine whether a violation was disease-driven. The medical pro-
fessional may first consider whether the violation falls within 
one of the eleven categories, and then consider whether the re-
sponse was due to a certain stimuli that is associated with us-
ing. A certain amount of subjectivity will be inherent in any di-
agnosis regarding a brain disorder, but that does not mean that 
a medical professional is unable to make those classifications, 
 
 168. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 481–84.  
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especially with the clear criteria and guidance provided by 
DSM-V. 
The second criticism is grounded in the concern that re-
sponding therapeutically to court violations will “encourage[] 
the abdication of individual responsibility for outrageous con-
duct.”169 A non-punitive response allows behavior that would 
normally be classified as criminal conduct, such as violating a 
condition of probation by using, to go unpunished. In consider-
ing the concern, it is important to first note that under this 
Note’s proposal not all violations are responded to therapeuti-
cally. Therapeutic responses will only be administered for those 
behaviors that directly result from the compulsive nature of se-
vere substance use disorder. All other violations will be re-
sponded to with a swift and punitive response. This criticism is 
also based on the faulty premise that individuals with severe 
substance use disorder are responsible for, or able to control, all 
their actions. This premise has been rejected in DSM-V, which 
discusses the genetic and neurobiological components of sub-
stance use disorder,170 and therefore discounts the assumption 
that the decision to use can be encouraged or discouraged in all 
situations. This Note’s proposal will hold individuals responsi-
ble for their behavior when it is appropriate to do so—when 
there is a non-disease-driven violation of drug court conditions.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that there may come a 
point at which an individual is unable to comply with the con-
ditions of the court, or abstain, to the point that it undermines 
public safety. As noted above, both rehabilitation and public 
safety are guiding jurisprudential foundations for drug 
courts.171 At that point, the court may determine that the needs 
for public safety outweigh the potential for rehabilitation and 
terminate the individual’s participation in drug court. Although 
the termination procedures are beyond the scope of this Note, 
the solution does not suggest that rehabilitation and treatment 
must come above the need for public safety. Instead, the two 
should be pursued contemporaneously where possible. This 
Note concedes that eventually a drug court may determine that 
treatment is no longer a feasible option. However, in keeping 
with the principles of procedural justice, it is important that if 
such a determination is made, it is based on the countervailing 
 
 169. Peele, supra note 15, at 21; see also Hanson, supra note 15 (arguing 
that the disease model provides an excuse for poor behavior).  
 170. See DSM-V, supra note 19, at 494.  
 171. See ZWEIG ET AL., supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
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purposes of the drug court and is reviewable by an appellate 
court.172 By clarifying the standards for administering sanc-
tions, or the ultimate sanction of drug court termination, appel-
late courts will have the tools needed to review court decisions 
and ensure court participants are treated fairly and in a man-
ner consistent with procedural justice.  
  CONCLUSION   
People addicted to substances were historically viewed as 
“weak” and unwilling to lead moral lives.173 Science has since 
taught us that addiction is a chronic and progressive disease 
characterized by an inability to control substance use. Research 
has also shown that addiction leads to crime. Drug courts 
emerged to address both the underlying disease of substance 
use disorder and the criminal behavior that manifests from 
that disease. Currently, however, the majority of drug courts do 
not clearly distinguish these two purposes when responding to 
drug court violations. 
Drug courts should clarify their procedures for administer-
ing sanctions. Knowledge of substance use disorder, deterrence 
theory, and procedural justice should guide responses to viola-
tions. The responses should be included in a behavioral con-
tract that is administered at the beginning of drug court partic-
ipation. The contract should distinguish between therapeutic 
responses to disease-driven violations, such as the recently so-
ber addict who cannot yet control the impulse to use in re-
sponse to certain stimuli, and sanctions for non-disease-driven 
violations. In moments of relapse, especially in early remission, 
the addicted participant should be supported and medically re-
sponded to, not punished for his or her underlying disease and 
compulsive behavior. Whereas for non-disease-driven viola-
tions, jail should be administered as a sanction in order to most 
effectively deter those violations and increase the perception of 
fairness among in drug court participants. 
Sanctions need to be clarified in drug courts. This Note’s 
recommendation for responding to drug court violations would 
most effectively balance and uphold the therapeutic and puni-
tive components of drug court, leading to a safer society with 
 
 172. But cf. State v. Perkins, 661 S.E.2d 366, 367 (S.C. 2008) (stating that 
the state supreme court has no authority to “evaluate and assess the manner 
in which the [drug court] administrators execute the rules and regulations of 
the [drug court]”). 
 173. Leshner, supra note 19, at 45. 
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less crime committed by individuals suffering from severe sub-
stance use disorder.  
 
